Information Privacy and the Critique of Control
Abstract
This contribution engages directly with the critique of individual control advanced in The Privacy Fallacy. It distinguishes three strands of critique: the failure of notice‑and‑choice mechanisms, the impossibility of individual self‑management in modern digital environments, and the conceptual critique that questions whether individual control should remain a central value of privacy law.
While acknowledging the flaws Cofone identifies in consent‑based frameworks, the text argues that individual control continues to play an important role in human psychology and identity formation. Drawing on social and behavioral science, it suggests that perceived control is essential for autonomy, selfhood, and the ability to navigate social interactions. Instead of abandoning control as a regulatory ideal, the analysis proposes reconceptualizing it as a dynamic, ongoing process that involves boundary negotiation rather than static, point‑in‑time consent.
The contribution concludes by arguing that privacy regulation must integrate systemic protections with mechanisms that support individuals' sense of agency, thereby aligning with Cofone’s broader call for frameworks that reflect both human behavior and structural constraints.
Keywords
Notice-and-choice critique – Perceived control – Privacy as control – Privacy theory – Self-management limits – Selfhood and autonomy – Value critique